The Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance (PA Additional Protocol) sets forth an additional layer for the protection of foreign investment to the preexisting International Investment Agreements (IIAs) between the PA Member States, posing a number of systemic questions regarding the application and interpretation of different treaty provisions and the way how they interplay. Against this background, the chief purpose of this article is to ascertain the extent to which the PA Member States have preserved a regulatory space for the protection of their essential interests in the PA Additional Protocol and the pre-existing IIAs between them. Particular emphasis is given to variations in the scope of national security and public order exceptions vis-à-vis other investment treaty provisions, taking into account potential situations of overlapping and conflict of norms between the PA Additional Protocol and the pre-existing IIAs in place.
Envisaged as an area of deep integration, the stepping stone of the Pacific Alliance draws on the fact that the four PA Member States have already in force free trade and investment agreements between each other, a condition that is also required for States who want to become Members of this regional economic integration organization. 2 This set of treaties is divided into five Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) containing investment chapters and one Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). 3 Importantly, none of these treaties corresponds to the traditional IIAs based on a first generation of European Model BITs, which were mainstream before the advent of FTAs with investment chapters similar to Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 4 As such, most of the existing IIAs between 2 the PA Member States reflect both the aim of protection of investment already in place in host States as well as of liberalization regarding the admission and establishment of foreign investment. 5 They also contain important references that circumscribe the meaning and scope of IIA provisions with a view to strike a balance between investment protection and the right to regulate in the public interest.
It is noteworthy, however, that the coexistence of different treaties addressing the same subject-matter between the same State parties does not necessarily amount to potential conflicts of norms. As a matter of general international law, it is presupposed that successive treaties are not incompatible with each other and may coexist in light of a harmonizing and systemic interpretation which avoids conflicts in the first place. 6 This approach to the application of successive treaties is also embedded in Article 1.2 of the PA Additional Protocol which sets out, as a general rule, that the Parties confirm their rights and obligations stemming from other international agreements between them, and states that, in case of an alleged inconsistency with other international agreements, the concerned Parties shall initiate consultations in order to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. A footnote to this provision complements and orients the mutually supportive relationship sought vis-à-vis other international agreements between the Parties, by clarifying that the sole fact that another treaty grants a more favourable treatment to goods, services, investments or people will not be deemed as incompatible with the provisions of the PA Additional Protocol. 7 It may be noted, therefore, that the PA Member
States have pursued to articulate the different IIAs applicable inter se by suggesting that concurring provisions among different treaties shall be interpreted in the most favourable terms for the protection of foreign investment. 8 Regional Trade Agreements: Recent Developments in Investment Rulemaking', in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under International Investment Agreements -A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010) 4-5. 5 Except for the FTA between Colombia and Mexico, all the IIAs in force between the PA Member States contain standards of most favourable nation treatment and national treatment which apply to the preestablishment phase of an investment. 6 The application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter is addressed in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which content is also considered to be part of customary international law. Paragraph 3 of the said Article states that when all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter 
II. Safeguarding the essential interests of the PA Member States in IIAs through public order and essential security general exceptions
The inclusion of general exceptions in IIAs is ultimately aimed at preserving a regulatory space for the protection of public interests, and it is envisaged as a means to justify the adoption or maintenance of measures that otherwise would be precluded in light of the rights and obligations contained in an IIA. In the particular case of public order and essential security general exceptions, the fact that they involve the essential interests of the State is a powerful reason for relying on a wording that accords greater flexibility for the adoption of measures with a negative impact on investment protection. Indeed, this is arguably the rationale underlying the inclusion of general exceptions with a "self-judging" character. At the same time, however, the most recent investment treaty practice, including that of the PA Member States, also reflects a greater concern for preserving investment protection from abusive interpretations of public order and essential security exceptions. Some of these treaty exceptions are modelled on similar provisions under the WTO law and reflect a more stringent approach as compared with a first generation of Party necessary to preserve public order. The exclusion of "legal persons" is not a common trait in the wording of public order exceptions in IIAs. Indeed, the investment arbitration cases where it was raised a defence based on a public order exception involved measures in the context of an economic crisis that were not circumscribed to "natural persons". 10 Second, the adoption or maintenance of measures must be "necessary" to preserve public 5 order and they cannot be applied in a manner that constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination". Whereas a "necessity" nexus requirement to adopt restrictive measures is in line with the mainstream pattern of public order exceptions in IIAs, the condition that such measures are not applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination is only reflected in most recent IIAs that draw on the wording of GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. 11 Third, and more significantly, the scope of Article 18.2 is substantially limited as compared to other similar provisions in IIAs in what its sole footnote clarifies that the rights and obligations under the Investment Chapter shall remain applicable. 12 As such, this provision arguably operates in a different fashion than an investment treaty exception by which it would be limited the scope of the investment provisions to which the exception applies.
The confirmation of the rights and obligations under the Investment Chapter is problematic because it seems to jeopardise the "effect utile" of the non-precluded measure clause. It arguably implies that Article 18.2 does not operate as a genuine treaty exception by which the scope of primary norms in the treaty is delimited vis-à-vis the scope of the treaty exception, but it leads to assume instead that its purpose is only to shed light on the interpretation of the provisions to which it applies, without delimiting the scope thereof, so as they are not read in a way that prevent the Parties from adopting measures for the safeguard of public order.
From the six IIAs in force between the PA Member States, three include public order exceptions. As compared to the non-precluded measure clause contained in Article 18.2 of the PA Additional Protocol, the exceptions set forth in the previous IIAs have a broader scope or contain less stringent conditions to adopt or maintain measures for the safeguard of public order. With respect to their coverage, only the public order exception in the FTA between Chile and Colombia is similar to Article 18.2 in what it is limited to the adoption or maintenance of measures related to "natural persons". Furthermore, regarding the conditions required to adopt or maintain restrictive measures, the Chile-Colombia FTA is the only one that requires that those measures are not applied in a manner that constitutes an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 13 The other IIAs that include a public order exception, namely the Colombia-Mexico FTA and the Colombia-Peru FTA, are 11 Both GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV require that a policy measure is not applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. 12 A similar wording can be found in the public order general exception set forth in Article 2201 (4) of the Colombia-Canada FTA, signed in 21 November 2008. This provision relates to the adoption or maintenance of measures for preserving public order, but states at the same time that the rights and obligations under the Agreement, in particular the rights of investors under the Investment Chapter, "remain applicable to such measures". Two caveats must however be expressed. First, it is questionable to assert that the entire treaty exception has a self-judging character. The real implication of the reference "measures deemed necessary" is that the appraisal of the necessity to adopt restrictive measures for protecting the essential security interests of the State is mainly an exclusive prerogative of the State who invokes the exception. This circumstance clearly relies on deference as the standard of review to be applied in investment arbitration, but it does not exempt the application of the treaty exception from judicial review. Indeed, it is argued that even the measures deemed necessary to protect the essential interests of the State remain subject to judicial review under the general principle of good faith. 15 At the same time, the assessment of whether the particular facts in a case relate to one of the three 
B. Standards on non-discrimination
All the IIAs between the PA Member States include obligations on non-discrimination through the standards of National Treatment (NT) and Most-favored Nation Treatment (MFN). As an important common feature to all these IIAs, it is observed that the NT and MFN standards always require comparison of investors/investments that are "in like circumstances". Such a provision, as noted by the UNCTAD, can go some way in safeguarding the State's right to regulate in the public interest. 23 Some investment tribunals have found that two investments are not in "like circumstances" where there is a legitimate policy rationale for differentiating between them, not motivated by protectionism. 24 Moreover, the majority of investment tribunals have taken a softer approach than "necessity" under general exceptions looking only for a "reasonable" or "rational" nexus between the measure and the policy pursued. 25 In the context of the IIAs between the PA Member States, the foregoing construction of IIA obligations on non-discrimination may affect an "effet utile" interpretation of general exceptions modelled on GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. This is arguably the case of the public order "exception" set forth in Article 18.2 of the PA Additional Protocol, in what its nexus requirement is based on "necessity" and its application is subject to the condition that the State's measure is not applied in a manner that constitutes an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. General exceptions of this type might be interpreted restrictively and may provide even less regulatory flexibility for host States than the IIA standards on non-discrimination based on the criterion of investors/investments that are in "similar circumstances". 26 
C. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
The FET standard, especially as it has been drafted in traditional IIAs, is oftentimes catalogued as an all-encompassing provision, and it is deemed controversial due to its open-ended and largely undefined nature used by investors to challenge any type of governmental conduct considered inequitable or unfair. 27 Most of the IIAs between the PA Member States contain, however, FET standards which scope is circumscribed to the minimum standard of treatment governed by customary international law. As mentioned by the UNCTAD, this approach to the standard may raise the threshold of State liability by requiring that the challenged conduct be found to 13 amount to egregious or outrageous mistreatment of foreign investors, helping to preserve the State's ability to adapt their policies in light of changing objectives. 28 The IIAs that refer to the FET standard as part of a minimum standard of treatment within customary international law draw on the US and Canadian Model BITs. 29 The standard under both Models is also drafted in a way that prevents an overextended interpretation thereof by stating that a determination that there has been a breach 33 The UNCTAD identifies two reform areas related to the objective of safeguarding the right to regulate in IIAs. On the one hand, it posits to draft clearly defined IIA standards of protection, namely FET, indirect expropriation and MFN. On the other hand, it is suggested to incorporate "safety valves" in IIAs, e.g. exceptions for public policies, national security and balance-of-payment crises. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (n 23) 
